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ROBERT W. SLOAN
NEW IRELAND
MEN IN PU RSU IT OF A FORLORN HOPE,
1779-1784
In the late spring o f 1779 a British arm ada sailed from  
Halifax, Nova Scotia, crossed the m outh o f the Bay of 
Fundy, and en tered  Penobscot Bay where it occupied the 
present-day site o f Castine, Maine. While one of its 
purposes was to establish a military base from  which new 
strategy in the American Revolution could in part be 
im plem ented, it was also to make the place a haven 
for refugee Am erican Loyalists fleeing from  rebel 
persecution. More precisely, the haven was to be the 
cornerstone o f a new British colony whose east-west 
boundaries were to be the Penobscot and St. Croix rivers. 
Called New Ireland, the colony was in tended to be a 
perm anent one.
T he three people who originated the idea for the colony 
included two Americans, Loyalists Jo h n  Calef and Jo h n  
N utting, and one Englishman, William Knox, u n d er­
secretary o f state for the colonies in the British cabinet 
headed by Lord Frederick N orth. Calef and  N utting, 
although they did not know each o ther p rio r to the 
establishm ent o f New Ireland, had m uch in common. 
Both had homes near Boston, Massachusetts, which they 
had lost because they were Loyalists. Both had developed 
connections with eastern Maine before the war. And 
each of them , separately, contacted the British govern­
m ent regarding the fu tu re of that region. N utting’s 
com m unication was m ore direct, at least with U nder­
secretary Knox, the man who would be the prim e m over 
o f the scheme in England, but C alef s came first.
73
Calef, a doctor of medicine and form er representative 
to the Massachusetts provincial assembly,1 first became 
linked with the Penobscot Bay area in 1772 when Thomas 
Hutchinson, lieutenant-governor of Massachusetts, sent 
him to England to represent settlers at Penobscot who 
wanted their land claims confirmed bv royal grant. Calef 
presented their case and returned  home.
The land confirmations were not yet completed when 
the rebellion began, and in the meantime, three months 
before Lexington and Concord, Dr. Calef wrote to Sir 
Francis Bernard, form er governor of Massachusetts now 
living in London, that the Penobscot people desired the 
establishment of a separate governm ent for the area. 
When B ernard passed the idea on to the earl of 
D artm outh, then secretary of state for the colonies, he 
urged its acceptance because it would make a "resort for 
the persecuted loyalists of New England.1’2 T here is no 
evidence to indicate that the proposal was ever delivered 
to D artm outh’s successor, Lord George Germain. But, 
since William Knox held his position under both 
D artm outh and Germain, he may have kept it in mind. It 
did not arise again, however, until John  Nutting appeared 
in England two years later.
N utting’s association in the lum ber trade along the 
Maine coast and his purchase of tim ber lands on 
Penobscot Bay indirectly resulted in his involvement in the 
establishment o f New Ireland. His business enterprises 
attracted the attention of British military authorities in 
Boston when barracks were needed for incoming troops in 
1774. Nutting was asked to supervise their construction 
and he accepted.
N utting’s continued association with the British after the 
war began led to his meeting William Knox. His repeated 
work for the military, building barracks in Boston until its 
evacuation, then building fortifications at Halifax, Nova 
Scotia, earned for him a trip to England in 1777. He went
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to repo rt on the naval failure to take the rebel outpost o f 
Machias. T he office to which he reported  was the colonial 
office; the officer was Knox.3 N utting and Knox found a 
m utual interest in the fu ture of Penobscot and, while it is 
not recorded who initiated discussion on the topic, in 
January  1778, Knox induced N utting to write to Lord 
Germain about the possibility o f establishing a post there.
N utting responded enthusiastically. He described a 
peninsula whose harbor could hold the entire British navy 
and was so easily defendable that a thousand men and two 
ships could protect it against any continental force. He 
noted how the people of the area were well disposed to 
British control and how the post would be strategically 
located to carry the war to New England as well as to 
protect Nova Scotia from  attack.4
Nutting did not specifically mention the place as a 
refuge for Loyalists, but his emphasis (or that of Knox) 
upon its strategic value was sure to bring a receptive 
response from  Germain. At this particular time Lord 
George Germain was in need of new military plans. He 
had become colonial secretary in 1775 because he be­
lieved that the rebellion should be suppressed. Given 
responsibility for planning British strategy in the war,5 he 
employed tactics that had been quite successful early in the 
struggle; but now, in 1778, events were posing threats to 
both his position and strategy. T he prolonged fighting, the 
defeat of General John  Burgoyne at Saratoga in October 
o f 1777, and the possibility of a French alliance with the 
Americans were all contributing to the growing dem and 
in England to end the war. In fact, parliam entary opposi­
tion would soon cause Prime Minister N orth to send 
commissioners to America to discuss peace. In the 
meantim e Germ ain had to continue military operations, 
and it was in the midst of this two-way approach to the 
struggle that Knox had N utting introduce the potential of 
Penobscot.6
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Germain accepted the idea and plans for the post were 
completed in England in Septem ber 1778. Although 
G erm ain  was p rim arily  co n ce rn ed  w ith m ilitary  
operations, he broadened the scheme to include the 
establishment of a new colony in the Penobscot area. 
Situated between New England and Nova Scotia, it would 
be called New Ire land ,7 and it would be a haven for 
refugee Loyalists, w hether or not the war was won.8 On 
Septem ber 2 Germain drafted the following orders for 
General George Clinton, com m ander-in-chief of British 
forces in North America:
T he distress of the King's loyal American subjects who have been 
driven from their habitations and deprived of their property by the 
rebels has been an object of attention with His Majesty and Parliament 
from the first appearance of the rebellion; and very considerable sums 
have been expended in furnishing them with a temporary support. But, 
as their num ber is daily increasing and is much to be apprehended (if a 
reconciliation does not soon take place) that scarcely any who retain 
their principles will be suffered to remain in the revolted provinces, it is 
judged  proper in that event that a perm anent provision should be made 
by which they may be enabled to support themselves and their families 
without being a continual burden upon the revenue of Great Britain.
T he  tract of country that lies between Penobscot River and the River 
St. Croix, the boundary of Nova Scotia on that side, offers itself for the 
reception o f  those meritorious but distressed people. And it is the 
King’s intention to erect it into a province . . .
As the first step toward making this establishment it is His Majesty’s 
pleasure, if peace has not taken place and the season of the year is not 
too far advanced before you receive this, that you do send such a 
detachment o f  troops at Nova Scotia, o r  of the provincials under your 
immediate command, as you shall judge  proper and sufficient to 
defend themselves against any attempt the rebels in those parts may be 
able to make during the winter to take post on Penobscot River, taking 
with them all necessary implements for erecting a fort, together with 
such ordnance and stores as may be proper for its defense, and a 
sufficient supply of provisions.9
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Germain also cited o ther reasons for the post, repeating 
the claims that N utting had listed in his January  letter. But 
he had his own motives as well for the operation. In a 
Novem ber directive to Clinton that was marked “very 
secret,” he rem inded the general that keeping the coasts 
constantly alarm ed and destroying or disrupting enemy 
shipping could be im portant enough to retu rn  the 
provinces to British allegiance.10 Note should be made of 
the earlier suggestion by Germain that provincials be used. 
With the forthcom ing southern campaigns that would 
ultimately take Lord Charles Cornwallis to Yorktown and 
defeat, Loyalists were to get their opportunity to support 
their cause more activelv.
T he colonial office decided that John  Nutting should 
deliver the orders to General Clinton. Germain and Knox 
felt that, since N utting had been a “longtime resident” of 
the Penobscot region, the personal contact would expedite 
matters. They also recom m ended that he be the engineer 
for the proposed fortifications.11
Nutting sailed immediately for America but ran into 
trouble on the way. T he mail packet on which he was 
traveling encountered an American privateer, and after a 
brief battle in which Nutting was wounded (he sank the 
dispatches he was carrying), he and the packet crew found 
themselves captives. They were taken to Corunna, Spain, 
where Nutting was exchanged,12 and whence he promptly 
wrote to Knox of his adventures and. plight.13 Knox in 
tu rn  com m unicated a ra ther forlorn note to Germain. 
“Poor Nutting and the Penobscot orders,” he wrote, “have 
missed their way for this year and I fear something will 
happen to prevent our taking possession of the country 
in the spring.”14
Knox need not have worried. N utting’s copy of the 
orders for General Clinton was not the only one sent. 
Consequently, by the time that N utting got to New York
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the following M arch, m any arrangem ents for the 
establishm ent of the post had already been made. And 
thus Castine was occupied by the British arm ada in June.
No progress toward official recognition of New Ireland 
was attem pted during  the winter and spring of 1779-1780. 
In  O ctober o f the first year G erm ain and Knox 
approached form er Massachusetts Lieutenant-Governor 
Thom as H utchinson about the possibility o f his becoming 
the first governor o f the new province. Hutchinson’s 
reluctance about the position and his apprehensions for 
the whole scheme, however, dam pened the officials’ 
enthusiasm  and they did nothing more about New 
Ire land’s status until the next year.15
T hen , in Ju n e  1780, Dr. Jo h n  Calef made another 
appearance in London. As he had twice already in the 
past, Calef came to England as a representative of the 
Penobscot inhabitants in o rd er to petition the royal 
governm ent for confirm ation of prew ar land grants. This 
time, he had o ther requests as well. Calef stressed the great 
needs of a people "destitute o f Law and Gospel” and asked 
for two things for them. A very loyal people who lived in 
an area o f exceptional economic potential, he wrote in 
his petition, desired that a governm ent separate from 
Massachusetts Bay be established at Penobscot and that 
a m inister o f the Church o f England be sent to them .16 
In brief, it was a fine appeal for God, king, and good 
governm ent, and it gave G erm ain’s office substantial 
reasons to persuade the rest o f the governm ent to establish 
a new royal colony.
Shortly afterw ards, Germain and Knox drew up a 
constitution for New Ireland for presentation to the 
cabinet as a w hole.17 It called for a governm ent directed by 
a governor and privy council and supported  by an u pper 
house o f legislature which would be appointed by the 
crown. T here  would be an elected assembly but its con­
trol of finances — a sore point in previous colonial 
governm ental structures — was to be limited. T he 
executive was to receive a fixed income plus sufficient 
perm anent revenue to support the governm ent. An oath 
of allegiance would be required of all citizens who, in turn , 
would be granted parcels o f land, the more meritorious 
Loyalists receiving larger grants, thereby assuring, by their 
presence, an aristocratic elem ent to the society. T he 
Church of England would be the officially recognized 
church and its m inisters’ salaries would be guaranteed by 
the governm ent. Any questions regarding what English 
laws would prevail in the colony would be decided by the 
attorney general’s office in London.
Germain presented the constitution to the rest of Lord 
N orth ’s cabinet on August 10 where it was accepted 
immediately, and the next day George III added his royal 
approval.18 But shortly after that, the plan received its 
first major blow when Attorney General A lexander 
W ed d erb u rn  re tu rn e d  an op in ion  reg ard in g  the 
governm ent’s right to establish another colony in New 
England. Despite the fact that Massachusetts Bay was then 
in open rebellion, he declared that such an establish­
m ent violated that colony's charter rights; the British 
governm ent could not organize a new colony within the 
boundaries o f an already established one .19
Fearing that the law office’s decision would h inder any 
attem pt to gain support for the project from the House o f 
Commons, the cabinet tu rned  the project back to the 
Colonial Office, where Germain decided on a different 
tack. He would m aintain possession of Penobscot as a 
conquered territory, extend British control as far into the 
rest of Maine as possible, and leave the whole question of 
charter violations for the final peace settlem ent.20 With 
those intentions in mind he sent off orders to the British 
com m anders in America to make preparations for taking 
additional territory .21
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In  the m eantim e Dr. Calef and Jo h n  N utting became 
involved in the new arrangem ent. Calef attem pted to gain 
support for the colony from  William Petty, earl of 
Shelburne, form er secretary o f state for the southern 
departm ent, which had been in charge o f American 
colonial affairs. A lthough Shelburne had opposed the 
present adm inistration’s handling of the rebellion, he was 
a man whose influence would be invaluable to New 
Ireland regardless o f the outcome o f the w ar.22 As for 
N utting, he was also to take part in the new plans. Having 
come to London in 1780, he had accepted temporary 
em ploym ent as an engineer for coastal fortifications; and 
Germ ain intended that he be sent back to New York for 
the purpose o f joining the force which would occupy 
Falmouth and there assist in erecting defenses as he had 
done at Penobscot.23 N utting was to have sailed for 
America in 1781.
T he year 1781, however, was an ominous year for the 
colonial proposal. N utting did not leave England at the 
time because there were no fu rther regular offensive 
military operations in Maine. Two things prevented 
continued warfare: in the first place, G erm ain’s orders to 
General Clinton, including the plans for taking Falmouth, 
fell into the hands of the Americans; and in the second, 
the secretary’s overall strategy was dealt a fatal blow when 
British General Charles Cornwallis was defeated by 
W ashington at Yorktown in O ctober.24 Well might 
Germ ain rationalize the loss o f his orders; he could claim 
that, while they m ight incite the rebels to strengthen 
defenses at Falm outh, their publication would certainly 
induce m ore Loyalists to move to Penobscot.25 But the 
disaster at Yorktown was something else. Not only did it 
destroy any hope for offensives in Maine, it was the final 
blow to the already tottering adm inistration of Prime 
Minister Frederick North.
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In March 1782, N orth resigned. He had long been 
a reluctant officeholder and stayed until then only at 
the behest o f the king. W hen he left, Germain of course 
went with him, as did William Knox whose post 
as undersecretary  o f state for colonial affairs was 
abolished.26 Gone was the cabinet that had prom oted New 
Ireland and gone were the British officials who had 
cham pioned its cause. T he colony had received its second 
m ajor blow.
U ndaunted by the loss o f so much official support, Calef 
persisted in his dream . Once again he tu rned  to the earl of 
Shelburne, now secretary o f state for colonial affairs. 
Hardly had Shelburne been installed in office when Calef 
presented him with an imposing packet of inform ation 
dealing with Penobscot. T here  were letters recom m ending 
the doctor.27 T hen there was also a docum ent written 
by Calef and entitled "The State of the Inhabitants o f 
the District o f Penobscot, March, 1782.” T here  was a 
"M em orandum ," also by Calef, which lauded the potential 
growth and developm ent of eastern Maine, included a 
memorial from  the inhabitants of Penobscot requesting a 
"Royal governm ent," and suggested several methods for 
bettering the military situation against Massachusetts. 
T here  was a supporting docum ent written by Colonel 
Goldthwaite. And Calef added three more papers: a 
survey he had made in 1772, an account of the annual 
exports of the Bagaduce area for the period 1772-1775, 
and a copy of an opinion (dated December 18, 1717) 
listing the crown restrictions on the granting of lands east 
of the Penobscot River.2S
Before sailing back to America in April, Calef made 
several last-minute efforts for support for the colony. He 
met num erous times with General Guy Carleton, who was 
to replace General Clinton as com m ander o f British forces 
in America, and discussed with him the future o f M aine.29 
He again got the support o f Nutting, who wrote to Lord
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Shelburne on C alef s behalf and stressed the im portance 
o f Penobscot’s reten tion .30 And, finally, he had a last 
audience with Shelburne before he and N utting departed 
from  England.31
C alefs endeavors were complicated by changes in 
governm ent. T he governm ent o f which Shelburne was a 
m em ber was first headed by the marquis of Rockingham 
and was furn ished with authority by the House of 
Commons to treat for peace with the Americans, even at 
the cost o f rebel independence. Rockingham died on July 
1 and Shelburne took his place as prim e minister, holding 
that position long enough to gain a prelim inary peace 
treaty. D uring its negotiations Shelburne did not entirely 
give up the idea o f a Loyalist refuge in Maine. In April, 
while colonial secretary, he had ordered  reinforcements 
to Nova Scotia, elements o f which were transferred 
to Penobscot.32 And until Novem ber he had General 
Carleton devote some attention to the increased pro­
tection o f Fort George and surrounding  territory.33
By strengthening G reat Britain’s claim to the eastern 
territory, Shelburne hoped to have m ore bargaining 
pow er in the negotiations then going on in Paris. Richard 
Oswald was commissioned to represent the royal gov­
ernm ent there, and in October Shelburne gave him his 
directions regarding  Penobscot. Oswald was to insist upon 
as much Maine territory as possible to provide a Loyalist 
sanctuary. Should, however, the Americans be willing to 
“make a just provision for the Refugees,” Oswald could 
bargain away the region.34
At Paris Oswald was confronted by a determ ined John  
Adams of Massachusetts, one of the five jo in t com­
missioners elected by the American Congress to treat for 
peace with G reat Britain. Adams had come to Paris in 
O ctober well p repared  to deal with the question o f the 
Province of Maine. By November 10 all treaty terms
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satisfied him  except those concerning “Tories and 
Penobscot.” He saw no reason to com pensate people in his 
country who were “Dishonours and Destroyers.” As for 
Penobscot, he furnished considerable evidence in support 
o f M assachusetts’s claim to all o f Maine, particularly the 
land east o f the Penobscot River. T hat evidence included a 
record o f the event in which G overnor Pownall buried the 
lead plate in 1759 on the east bank o f the Penobscot River, 
records o f prew ar town plans for such settlements as 
M ount Desert and Machias, copies o f a g ran t made by 
Jam es I to Sir William A lexander which described the 
western boundary o f Nova Scotia (and therefore the 
eastern boundary o f Massachusetts Bay) as the St. Croix 
River, and statem ents written by several previous gov­
ernors of Massachusetts during  their term s o f office in 
which each o f them  claimed that the region was within his 
jurisdiction.35
In the end the issue was settled by a vague compromise. 
Adams and the Americans wanted the eastern district; 
Oswald wanted some recognition of the Loyalists’ plight. 
W hat the Englishm an got was sparse indeed; he gave up 
Great Britain’s claim to Maine in re tu rn  for a treaty clause 
requiring that Congress recom m end that each o f the states 
indem nify their Loyalists for losses suffered by them in the 
war. T he prelim inary treaty was signed at the Palace of 
Versailles on Novem ber 30, 1782 — and any hope for New 
Ireland was gone.
Twenty-five years after the conclusion o f the American 
war, Knox wrote a letter in which he blamed two people 
for the loss of Penobscot. A new province would have been 
erected, he wrote, “had not Mr. W edderburn, the 
attorney-general, in resentm ent of not being made a peer
. refused to give his fiat to the commission; and Lord 
Shelburne, for ignorance o f its im portance, ceded it to 
the Am ericans.”36 As for W edderburn, Knox’s attitude 
probably had not changed over the years, although the
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above was a more direct accusation than any earlier ones. 
For example, some time during the Revolution (1779?) he 
wrote "Curious Political Anecdotes” about various politi­
cal figures, one of whom was W edderburn. In them he 
described the attorney general as having “an assuming and 
forward m anner,” being most anxious for a peerage, and 
having been "deeply offended” by Lord Germain, who 
had expressed an opinion that W edderburn should be 
content with the attorney generalship rather than aspire to 
a seat in the House of Lords.37 Still piqued in 1789 by the 
wartime reversal of his colonial scheme, Knox described 
W edderburn 's part as follows:
It ma\ however be proper to give some account ot the cause of its (the 
establishment ot New Ireland) not being carried into execution, 
especialh as all the subjects ot the British empire will thereb\ rccene 
fresh proof, in addition to the mam thev are aheadv possessed ot, how 
great their happiness is, and how firm their securin tor their lives and 
properties, when a Magistrate [W edderburn was now Chief Justice of 
the Court of Common Pleas] who is so scrupulouslv observant of the 
sac redness ot charter rights that he would not suffer them in the least to 
be infringed, even in the case ot the re\olted subjects ot the 
Massachusetts B a \ . ;iK
Knox had also written about Lord Shelburne in 1789, 
stating that after the latter had taken over the British 
governm ent, he had asked Knox for his opinion about 
making peace with America. Knox thereupon explained to 
the prim e minister that he had presented two plans to 
Lord Germain, both of them calling for the retention of 
some British control in the colonies. T he second plan, the 
one most liked by Germain, had called for a treat) giving 
each side the territory which it controlled at the moment 
the fighting was concluded. T he possibility of such a peace 
based on the war map, Knox told Shelburne, was what 
caused the attack on Penobscot and the campaigns in the 
South. Adding those lands to areas already held, such as 
New York, Long Island, Canada, and Nova Scotia, "would, 
I was convinced, secure to this country all the trade of
tS4
America which was worth having, at a much less charge 
to the Nation, which we hitherto had been at for that 
country. He [Shelburne] asked me if I thought America 
would treat with us on such grounds? I said, that l had 
good reason to believe they would, . . His Lordship shook his 
head, and said, America would never agree to anything 
less than total independence."39
T here is one o ther detail about the form er under­
secretary’s rem em brances a quarter century after the 
American Revolution. He did not mention that Pen­
obscot had been taken for the purpose of becoming a 
Loyalist colon}'. Instead, he stressed its strategic value of 
protecting Nova Scotia and even Lower Canada "so as to 
insure the future safety and prosperity of British North 
America."40 He was, however, writing in 1808 in an 
advisory capacity with the expectation that another war 
might occur between Britain and the Lmitecl States and 
therefore was proposing not only strategy — the taking 
of Bagaduce again — but a means of rectifying the treaty 
of 1783 by regaining eastern Maine for his country.41 
Nevertheless, it is interesting that he concluded his 
estimate of Penobscot in the same m anner he started it 
in 1778, by prom oting its strategic value in wartime.
Perhaps New Ireland had always been a vain hope. 
Attorney General W edderburn’s decision, which opposed 
the colony’s establishment within the boundaries of 
M assachusetts, s topped  the B ritish  cab inet from  
continuing its efforts to complete a governm ent for it. 
American representative John  Adams, whose inflexible 
attitude opposed any loss of Massachusetts territory, 
especially for the sake o f Tories, caused the English peace 
commission to reconsider its desire to retain the land 
m eant for New Ireland. Prime Minister Shelburne, 
displaying the attitude that any peace with the Americans 
was preferable to the continuation of the war, was all too
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willing to concede its territory to the rebels. T he attitude 
o f any one o f these men could have been enough to kill the 
colonial plan; their com bined actions were m ore than 
sufficient. William Knox had continued his efforts to 
preserve the colony for the Em pire, but his effectiveness 
was considerably dim inished when he was pu t out of 
office. Jo h n  N utting had become only an occasional 
contributor to the cause. T he most conspicuous person, 
though, was Dr. Jo h n  Calef. His motive was singular, his 
efforts consistent; he strove for the inclusion of New 
Ireland in the fu tu re  o f things British and he devoted the 
war years to its fulfillment. To him New Ireland was never 
a vain hope.
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